Introduction
Evidentia.l rea.. '>oning in ex pert systems has often used ad-hoc uncertainty calculi. Although it is generally accepted that probability theory provides a firm theoretical fo undat ion, researchers have found some problems with its usc as a workable uncertainty calculus. Among these problems arc representation ol' ignorance, consistency of probabilistic judgements, and adjustment of a priori judgements with experience. The application of metaprobability theory to evidential reasoning is a new approaeh to solving these problems. We use the Dempstcr-Shafer theory, an altcrnativP theory of evidential reasoning to judge mctaprobability theory as a theory of evidential reasoning. This pap<>r will compare how metaprobability theory and Dcmpster-Shafer theory handle the adjustment of judgements with experience.
Section 2 and 3 describe the basics of the metaprobability and Dempster-Shafer theories.
Mctaprobability theory deals with higher order probabilities applied to evidential ren.'>oning. Dempster-Shafer theory is a generalization of probability theory which has evolved from a theory of upper�.a. nd lower probabilities.
Section 4 describes a thought experiment and the metaprobability and Dempstcr-Shafer ·analysis of the experiment. The thought experiment focuses on forming beliefs about a die from evidence accrued from two sensors: an odd-even sensor, a' nd a large-small sensor. For a large number of tosses, the odd even sensor sees half the tosses come up even, and the other half come up odd. For a different set of tosses of the same number, the large-small sensor sees half the tosses come up large and the other half small. Based on these two pieces of evidence, what should be the beliefs about the die?
Metaprobability Theory
Metaprobability theory deals with probability measures on the space of first-order probability distributions. In turn, the first-order distributions are defined over some domain state-space. In the field of probability theory, metaprobability has been known as "higher order probability" or "hierarchical probability". However, it is more appropriate to refer to the application of higher order probability to evidential reasoning as metaprobability because the order of the probability distribution eorresponds to the order of the meta-levei at which the probability theory is attempting to provide a quantifiable model of the evidential accrual process.
Many theorists have considered it only briefly due to the lack of practical applications to rnot.ivatc the usc of metaprobabilities as well as a lack of computational resources to implerrwnt t.hcrn. We believe that evidential reasoning is an appropriate application of metaprobabilitics and t.hat the computational problem can be overcome with current technology.
Figu re I shows gives an example. The domain state-space is the set of (heads, tails ). Th<> spac'<' of' c onsiste nt probability distributions consists of those such that p(heads) + p(t.ails) =: l. Two dilf<'r<'nt. Ill(' I a probabi I ity distri lw tions are shown. The flat distri but. ion rcpresen t.s extreme ig;nora n<'<' about. t. his si tuat ior1. The other d istri bu Lion represents know ledge that the coin is most probably "fair". Met.a. probabilistic updating of beliefs given evidence ts based on a straight-forward application of Bayes rule:
MLPD {E IS}
MLPD {p I S} dcnot<'s the prior nwt.;t-level distribution and MLPD {p I E, S} denotes the posterior dist.ribut.ion. TIH� AlLPD {E I p, S} is a mea.'iure of the likelihood of a particular body of evidence, giv<•n a p:ntieular urHkrlying first-orckr disLribut.ion. The ev aluation of this term is simple. For I'Xampl<·, if' E is an ol>sNvcd odd throw, the s ample space is the sides of a die, and we a.rc p;iv<'n a.
part.icula.r probability <knsity p =-"-{P (I },p (2),p (:J),p (4),p (5),p (6)}, then the value of MLPD {odd throw I p, S} is just p(l) + p(;l) + p(f>).
Dempster-Shafer Theory
Development of the Dcm pster-Sh afer theory was started by Arth 11 r Dempster [Dempster I 9fi7] and extended by Glenn Shafer !Shafer, 1976] . Many artificial intelligence researchers have turned to this theory in the hope of avoiding the pitfalls of using probability theory in evidential reasoning.
Dernpstcr-Shafer theory is a generali�ation of probability theory with its roots in a theory of upper and lower probabilities. Consequently, some of the importan t ideas in the theory can be thought of in terms of upper and lower probabilities. We give a brief description of the theory.
Let 8 be a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions about. a domain. 8 is called the frame of discernment. Let 2 8 denote the set of all subsets of 8. Subsets of 8 arc the propositions with which the theory is concerned. As a matter of convention, A and B will denote subsets of a frame ot' discernment.
We define three functions: the basic probability a._<;signment m, the belief function Bel, and the plausibility function Pl. These functions have the same domain and range. Their domain is 2 8 and their range is [0, 1].
A "ba.<;ie probability assignment" ( m ) must meet these constraints:
The "belief" function can be defined in terms of a ba.<;ic probabil ity a.'>Signrnent m by:
The "plausibility" function can be defined in terms of a belief function Bel by:
where A is the complement of A .
Each of the three functions carries the same information. That is, there is a unique one-to-one transformation between any of the functions. However each function has a unique interpretation. The "basic probability assignment" of a subset of 8 can be interpreted as the probability mass constrained to stay in the subset. The "belief" of a subset of 8 can be interpreted as the measure of the lower probability of the subset, that is the minimum probability mass in the subset. And the "plausibility" of a subset of 8 is the upper probability of the subset, that is the maximum probability mass in the subset.
A focal clement A of a frame of discernment 8 is a subset of 8 such that m (A) > 0. The union of the focal clements of a belief function is called its core.
Frames of discernment can be made to distinguish finer and coarser concepts by processes called refining and coarsening. A frame of discernment 0 is a refinement of another frame 8 if there exists refining function w such that:
Given a frame of discernm<'nt n, a frame of discernment 8, a refining function w from 8 ton, and a.
belief function Bel over 8 we defl ne Bel 0 to be the vacuous extension of Bel : LJ ce. �UJ )cA The vacuous extension of a belief function can be interpreted as the belief funcLion in the refined frame which places only the constraints explicitly required by the belief fundion in the coarsened frame.
All belief funetions are ela..'"l sified into two claRscs: support functions, and quasi-support fundions.
Quasi-support funetions arc those belief functions which have all of their probability maBscs on sets which are mutually exclusive. QuaRi-support fu nctions contain the set of probability mass fundions.
Support functions arc those belief funetions which Shafer believes "constitutes the subclass of belief functions appropriate for the representation of evidence". Support functions are dell ned by those belief functions whose core haR a positive mass function. What this means is that every subset in th<' frame of discernment ha.'"l a lower probability Bel which is strictly less than its upper probability Pl.
Given two belief functions over the same frame of discernment but based on distinct bodies of evidence, Dempster's H.ule of Combination can be used to compute a new belief function based on the combined evidence. Dempster's B.ule of Combination is defined by:
Experiment
We present a thought experiment designed to compare how metaprobability theory and Dempster
Shafcr theory update beliefs with evidence. The experiment is as follows:
"We are given a normal six-sided die and two sensors. One sensor can sense whether the top face of the die is odd or even. The other sensor can sense whether the top face of the die has four or more spots (large) or has three or less spots (small). We throw the die a large number of times with the odd-even sensor watching. The sensor reports that in exactly half the throws the die carne up even and in the other half it carne up odd. We throw the die the same number of times as before with the large-small sensor watching. The sensor reports that exactly half of the throws were large and half were small. What arc our beliefs about the outcome of next throw of the die given we can distinguish between the six outcomes?"
Mctaproba.bility Results
We have calculated the results of a simulated die throwing experiment using the meta. probability updating rule. We assumed a. uniform prior MLPD , i.e. given any two first order probability distributions p and q, we initially assume that MLPD (p) = MLPD ( q ). We use a simple updating rule based on Bayes Rule to update the evidence. Figure 2 shows the updating process.
In order to simulate probability distrib u tions in a machine environment, it is necessary to choose a discreti�ation of the interval [0,1]. We initially chose a coarse quantization into sixths for the first order probability distributions. That is, every probability mass is restricted to the values 0, 1/6, 1/3, 1/2, '2ja, 5/6, or 1. Discretizations by twelfths and eighteens given the same problem, priors, and evidence, yielded analogous results to those described below.
The experimental results show that in the limit (i.e. the number of tosses approaches infinity) the updated MLPD will consist of the distributions which meet the obvious "constraints" suggested by the evidence on odd-even and small-large probabilities. These consLraints arc: 
D<'rnpst<'r-ShafPr f{esults
We hav<' d<>t.er rn ined the results of the experiment using the Dcmpster-Shafcr approach. The approach w<· t.a ke ii-i first to usc the statistical estimation technique presented by Shafer [Shafer, 1975] on thP franli'S of dis cer n men t {odd, even} and {small, large} to create belief funetions for the two <'XJ><'rin)(•rtt . s. ThP two belief functions arc� then refined to the eomrnon frame of discern me nt {1 2 :J 1 5 I>} and I'OIII hi 111•d using D('lll psi er's ltulc of Corn bi nation to prod uee a bcliPf fu ndion which i� based on t hi' <'<>lnl>ilwd <·vid<'IH'<'. Figttr<' ;� shows Uw process ckseribed.
Tlw l irst st<·p is t.lll' statistical Pst . imat . ion Lechniqll<' on (he• frai!H's of discnnnwnt {odd, even } and {srrl:l!l, l:ir!!;<' } . In till' li1niL, (i.<·. a.-; the· nurnlH'r of trials go<'s to infinit.y ) tlw ha.o;; ie probability The interpretation of the results is that there is no doubt about the die with respect to odd-even and small-large. The probability masses on each set are exactly .5. That is, Bel (A ) = PI (A ) = .5 for A E{odd, even, large, small}. This feature places these basic probability assignments in the category of qua.'>i-support functions. These results are intuitive . As the number of trials gets large, one should eventually be content that the die is fair' with respect to· these attributes.
The second step is the refinement of the two quasi-support functions to a common frame . of discernment. This is done by first defining the refining functions w0,, and wu., where: • odd-<'V<'n cxperim<mt: largc•-srn:dl experiment: m(1,3,5) = .5, m(2,1,6) = .5 m(1,5,6) = .5 , m(1,2,3) = .5 TIH' third step is to combine the refined support functions using Dempster's Rule of Combination. Th!' n�snlts a.re: m(1,:3) = m(2) = m(1,6) = m(5) = .25
Tl1e interpretation of these results is that there is no uncertainty about the probability ma.'is on "2" and "f>", i.P., their probability masses arr exactly .25! This is certrtinly not intuitive.
If a large but finite number of tosses arc considered instead of the limiting Cll.. '>e, we can approximate Lhe resu Its of the statistical estimation procedure by: ·In this section we analyze the experimental results from met.aprobability theory and Dempstcr-Shafer t!H•ory. Although both theories recognize the inherent symmetries of (2, 5) and (1, 3, 4, 6), the similarities between the results arc few. In general, mctaprobability theory seems better fitted for this type of analysis. This is not surprising and perhaps even a little bit unfair since it is gener:tlly reeogn iz<'d that probability theory is well-suited for what is essentially a statistical estimation prohlcrn. WP will first discuss the metaprobability results and then the Dempster-Shafcr results.
We are satisfied with the results of metaprobability and the correctness of our method. The llH'Laprohahilit . y results have the interpretation that only first-order distributions which meet Ltw implicit e onstmints have a positive rnctaprobability ITHl..'l S. This seems rea.'ionable. The prior distril>ut ion does not rc•ally play a major role in this analysis sinee we have considered the limiting; <·ase (i.<•. alll<>tlnt of evidence goes to infinity). llowever, the prior meta-distribution does allow us to inC"Iud<· our prior I>Piiefs about. a "normal" die. If we believe that a "normal" die is "fair", it would be <';J. .o.; y to
